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We discuss how experiences that fill a future waiting period, such as focusing on fun or 
boring future activities, affect intertemporal choices. We propose that savoring, the positive 
utility derived from anticipating future pleasant outcomes, is more likely to have an impact on 
intertemporal choices when the future seems boring than when it seems fun. We provide 
empirical evidence that people who foresee a busy future full of boring activities are more 






Intertemporal choices are decisions in which the timing of costs and benefits are spread out 
over time (Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989). Among tradeoffs implied in intertemporal choices 
we may consider the decision between waiting for larger rewards and having smaller rewards 
sooner. For example, I may have to decide whether to buy a less preferred shirt that is 
available immediately (sooner-smaller reward) or to wait for a more preferred shirt that will 
be available in one month’s time (larger-later reward). I may also face the decision between 
paying more to have an online purchase delivered sooner and paying less to have it delivered 
later. Many factors affect such decisions, e.g., the presentation of a future interval in date or 
delay format (LeBoeuf, 2006; Read et al., 2005), cognitive resources (Ebert, 2001), and time 
perspective (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999).  
 
In this paper we discuss how experiences that fill a future waiting period affect intertemporal 
choices. In studying experiences that fill a period relevant for an intertemporal choice, we 
contrast the impact of thinking of fun or boring activities on preferences for larger- later vs. 
sooner-smaller rewards. Research suggests that people prefer sequences of increasingly 
pleasant outcomes to sequences of decreasingly pleasant outcomes. In situations in which past 
consumption levels set reference points for future consumption, individuals may prefer an 
increasing consumption profile, that is, people prefer a pattern of increasing utility over time 
(Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989). Such preferences reflect both savoring, the positive utility 
derived from anticipating future pleasant outcomes, and dread, the negative contemplation of 
unpleasant outcomes (Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989). In this paper we focus on the role 
savoring plays on intertemporal choices as a function of what experiences will fill a future 
waiting period. Loewenstein (1987) suggests one reason for delaying a pleasant outcome is 
the scarcity effect. People may want to delay consumption for when the item will not be 
available. In our context, people may delay a reward because they foresee fun will not be 
available in a future dominated by boring activities. 
 
People also demonstrate a desire to spread good outcomes evenly over time (Loewenstein and 
Prelec, 1993). This spread of good outcomes may be interpreted as a preference for not 
having to face long boring periods. This suggests people may be more likely to prefer larger-
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later rewards to sooner-smaller rewards when they foresee a boring future than when they 
foresee a fun future. Note that reward means a pleasant outcome. In this way, people would 
try to compensate for a boring future period by delaying a pleasant reward. We argue this 
delay provides a benefit over and above the objective benefit of receiving a larger- later 
reward, given that the tendency to prefer the larger-later reward would be greater when the 
future seems boring than when the future seems fun. In the case of a fun future, we suggest 
people would not tend to save fun for later.  
 
Although what is considered fun or boring depends on personal tastes, daily, most people tend 
to do both fun and boring activities. Fun activities might include chatting with friends, 
listening to music, and having dinner, whereas boring ones might include doing chores, 
grocery shopping, and taking public transportation. When people focus on either of these 
types of activities, they tend to forget their lives also include the other activity type. This 
phenomenon has been called focalism. Focalism is the tendency to think about a focal event, 
at the expense of other, unrelated events (Wilson et al., 2000). Focalism has been shown to 
apply to predictions about both affective and non-emotional events. When people focus too 
much on one event and not enough on other future events, they tend to overpredict the 
duration of affective reactions to the event.  
 
Given that people who tend to think of either fun or boring periods tend to be overly 
influenced by these thoughts, we argue it is likely that these focused people exhibit 
intertemporal preferences that depend on these thoughts. We suggest that people have a 
tendency to desire compensation for negative events, for example, boredom to come in the 
future. One way of having this compensation is delaying a pleasant reward instead of having 
it as soon as possible.  
 
The previous discussion leads to the hypothesis we test in this paper: "when people focus on a 
future period busy with boring activities, people prefer to delay pleasant events more than 
when people focus on a future not so busy with boring activities. By the same token, when 
people focus on a future period not so busy with fun activities, people prefer to delay pleasant 





The study discussed in this paper is part of a broader research on time perception and 
intertemporal choice. Only parts relevant to the scope of this paper are presented below. This 
study provides evidence for the tradeoff between having a reward sooner or later as a function 
of the degree of boredom foreseen in the future. Participants were randomly selected members 
of a panel. This panel is composed of approximately 400,000 people who participate in 
commercial online surveys. Our study was computer-based and run online. Sixty-three people 
participated in one of two conditions: fun (N = 31) or boring activities (N = 32). Twenty-nine 
were men and thirty-four were women. Average age was 35, with a minimum of 18 and 
maximum of 57.  
 
In both conditions, participants were informed this was an academic study and there was no 
time limit for completion. Participants were also told there were no right or wrong answers. 
Then participants were told the study was composed of small independent parts, each of them 
looking at different aspects of time preferences. The first task was designed to have people 
focus either on fun or boring activities. Participants were asked to cite the five activities, 
 2309 
either fun or boring, that would take most of their time during the following two weeks. For 
each activity, participants cited the activity, then were asked how often they did the activity in 
a year on a scale from (1) “never” to (5) “very often”. Participants were also asked to rate how 
much they enjoyed doing the activity on a (1) “I hate doing it” to (5) scale “I love doing it”. 
After the activities task and a couple of questions unrelated to this paper, participants were 
presented the intertemporal choice question. Participants were told to imagine they had won a 
$150 gift certificate to be received two weeks from the present moment. The question asked, 
instead of receiving the gift certificate two weeks from the experiment date, what was the 
minimum the participant would require to prefer the certificate immediately. Thus, 
participants were asked to state a lower dollar amount that they would tradeoff for not having 
to wait two weeks for the gift certificate. Subsequently, participants responded a series of 
questions irrelevant for this study. Then participants answered a busyness question on a (1) 
“the next two weeks will be strongly less busy than my typical week” to (5) “the next two 
weeks will be strongly busier than my typical week” scale.  
 
In addition to our main variables, we also collected information on individual factors which 
have been shown to affect preferences for sooner-smaller rewards. These factors were used as 
covariates in our analyses to control for such individual factors. Emotions felt at the time of 
decision have been shown to exert high negative impact on willingness to delay rewards. 
People’s visceral demands urge for sooner rewards, even at the expense of significantly larger 
rewards in the future (Loewenstein, 1996). To account for emotions, participants were asked 
to rate how they were feeling at the moment on five 10-point semantic differential scales 
anchored on: depressed/cheerful, unhappy/happy, bored/excited, nervous/relaxed, bad/good.  
 
Another factor that may affect preferences for sooner-smaller rewards is time perspective. 
Time perspective is the often nonconscious process whereby the continual flows of personal 
and social experiences are assigned to temporal categories, or time frames, that help to give 
order, coherence, and meaning to those events (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). Given the 
probable influence present and future perspectives may have on intertemporal choices in our 
research, we use them as covariates in our analyses. To measure time perspective we used the 
scale presented in Keough, Zimbardo, and Boyd (1999).  
 
We expected participants in the boring condition who felt busier than normal to compensate 
for boredom in the future by delaying the award of the certificate, that is, large amounts of 
money would be requested to have the certificate today. Otherwise, these participants were 
expected to prefer to defer the prize. By the same token, we expected participants who felt 
less busy than normal with boring activities to have a lesser need to compensate for future 
boredom, therefore would prefer less money to have a gift certificate today than participants 
who foresaw two weeks busy with boring activities. The inverse of these results was expected 





For each of the five activities that participants described as activities that would take most of 
their time in the following two weeks, people reported how much they enjoyed doing each 
activity on a scale from (1) “I hate doing it” to (5) “I love doing it”. Activities reported in the 
fun condition were enjoyed more (M = 4.57, SD = .37) than activities reported in the boring 
condition (M = 2.29, SD = .66, p < .001).  
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In this study we are interested in the effect of busyness and type of future activities (fun or 
boring) on willingness to delay pleasant outcomes. For this analysis we regressed the log of 
the dollar amount asked to receive a certificate today (instead of $150 in two-weeks) on  
condition (fun or boring), busyness, and the interaction between condition and busyness. The 
interaction allows us to test how the effect of busyness is moderated by condition. To control 
for individual factors, the following covariates were added to the model: future and present 
time perspective, and emotional state at the time of the study. Condition was coded as 
follows: boring = 0, fun = 1. Results are shown on Table 1. To provide a visual representation 
of the results, in Figure 1 we present a graph of dollar amount per median split on busyness 
(high/low busyness) per condition. In support of our hypothesis we found that, when busyness 
is high in the boring condition, people ask the higher dollar amounts to receive the prize 
today, that is, they have a preference for a larger- later reward, than when busyness is low in 
the boring condition. People who are not very busy with boring activities in the future will not 
feel the need to compensate for the future, therefore will prefer the sooner-smaller reward. 
Although our sample is small for conclusively testing the conditions separately, our data 
suggests this was the case in the boring condition, as shown in Table 2 (marginal busyness 
effect). Despite being in the right direction, we did not obtain a significant effect of busyness 
in the fun condition (results are available from the authors). 
 






(Constant) 2.537 0.605 4.195 0.000
busyness 0.370 0.141 0.505 2.618 0.012
condition 1.749 0.619 1.324 2.827 0.007
busyness x condition -0.525 0.188 -1.463 -2.793 0.007
future 0.223 0.059 0.497 3.758 0.000
present -0.003 0.056 -0.006 -0.049 0.961
depressed - cheerful 0.231 0.101 0.793 2.292 0.026
unhappy - happy -0.184 0.113 -0.666 -1.623 0.111
bored - excited 0.108 0.059 0.350 1.834 0.072
nervous - relaxed 0.032 0.041 0.110 0.760 0.451










































Figure 1. Mean (left) and median (right) of dollar amount asked in exchange for 





Our empirical results provide evidence that people compensate future boring periods by 
delaying pleasant outcomes. As for the covariates, we see from the regression coefficients that 
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future time orientation was a good predictor of willingness to delay the prize. People higher in 
future orientation tended to request more money to have the certificate now than people lower 
in future orientation. In addition, the better (bad-good) individuals felt at the time of the 
experiment, the more they preferred a sooner-smaller reward. Maybe feeling good induced an 
urge for more immediate rewards in the same way as visceral factors. We also obtained an 
effect by which the more cheerful and excited one felt at the time of the experiment, the more 
one preferred a larger- later reward. This means that the more depressed and bored one felt, the 
more one preferred a sooner-smaller reward. This may represent a way of compensating the 
present, which may seem worse than a boring future.  
Table 2. Boring condition. Regression coefficients with dollar amount (ln) as DV. Adj-R-






(Constant) 1.859 0.968 1.920 0.067
busyness 0.347 0.192 0.371 1.806 0.084
future 0.299 0.121 0.511 2.476 0.021
present 0.078 0.087 0.147 0.894 0.380
depressed - cheerful 0.267 0.210 0.766 1.275 0.215
unhappy - happy -0.184 0.227 -0.573 -0.810 0.426
bored - excited 0.165 0.098 0.404 1.683 0.106
nervous - relaxed 0.048 0.099 0.118 0.484 0.633





We provide evidence that people tend to stock up for fun when they predict boring future 
periods. Most importantly, we show that the quality of the experiences that fill a waiting 
period affects intertemporal choices. This finding adds to previous research that shows people 
savor by anticipating pleasant future events. This is one reason why people have preferences 
that run counter traditional economic wisdom, which would suggest people are better off by 
having good outcomes as soon as possible instead of delaying them. The stronger results we 
find for boredom as compared to fun may be explained by the fact that positive emotional 
states are relatively fragile compared to negative emotional states (Kanouse and Hanson, 
1972, in Wilson et al., 2000). In a study in which people were asked to forecast their 
happiness either focusing on a single event now or thinking of other events as well, Wilson et 
al. (2000) found that, when asked to think about general future events that might occupy their 
thoughts, for positive events people made more moderate predictions both for the day of the 
event and subsequent days, whereas for negative events people made more moderate 
predictions only for the days after the event.  
 
Our findings suggest firms may be interested in having customers focus either on fun or 
boring future activities. A call center likely to receive customers’ complaints about products 
which were not delivered on time might profit from having customers listen to messages or 
advertisements while waiting reminding them of boring activities they have to do in the near 
future. We speculate that people would be more willing to accept later dates to receive the 
product. These activities may be simple activities, as mentioned by our participants: doing 
chores, going to the doctor, paying bills, grocery shopping, and so on. Another situation in 
which firms may use our findings is online shopping. When people shop online and are to 
choose a delivery option, suggesting that they will be involved in boring activities may lead 
people to prefer a delayed date when they will receive the good. As forcefully there is a delay 
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between purchase and delivery, customers may be happier to get a longer delivery date when 
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